Upstream Bundling and Leverage of Market Power by Cornière (de), Alexandre & Taylor, Greg
Upstream Bundling and Leverage of Market
Power∗
Alexandre de Cornie`re† and Greg Taylor‡
October 14, 2019
Abstract
We present a novel rationale for bundling in vertical relations. In
many markets, upstream firms compete to be in the best downstream
slots (e.g., the best shelf in a retail store or the default application
on a platform). Bundling by a multiproduct upstream firm can
soften competition for slots by reducing rivals’ value for them. This
strategy does not rely on entry deterrence and can be achieved
through contractual or even virtual tying. We also study the effects
of upstream bundling on the downstream market; by intensifying
competition there, bundling can leave consumers better-off even
when there is foreclosure upstream.
Keywords: bundling, exclusion, vertical relations.
JEL Classification: L1, L4.
∗We are grateful for useful discussions with Daniel Barron, Giacomo Calzolari, Jay Pil
Choi, Natalia Fabra, Sjaak Hurkens, Doh-Shin Jeon, Bruno Jullien, Markus Reisinger,
and Patrick Rey. We also thank participants at numerous seminars and conferences for
their constructive comments. De Cornie`re acknowledges funding from ANR under grant
ANR-17-EUR-0010 (Investissements d’Avenir program). Taylor acknowledges financial
support from the Carnegie Corporation of New York.
†Toulouse School of Economics, University of Toulouse Capitole, Toulouse;
alexandre.de-corniere@tse-fr.eu; https://sites.google.com/site/adecorniere
‡Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford; greg.taylor@oii.ox.ac.uk;
http://www.greg-taylor.co.uk
1
1 Introduction
Consider manufacturers bidding to have their product stocked in the best
shelf position in a retail store. One manufacturer is the sole supplier of a
popular product (A), and one of several suppliers of another product (B).
That manufacturer tells the retailer “you may only stock product A if you
put my version of product B on the best shelf”. Imagine what this might
do to rivals’ willingness to pay to be on the best shelf. They will realise
that if they are placed on such a shelf then it must be in a store that does
not offer the popular product A. But if some consumers value one-stop
shopping they will shun such a store, making its shelf slots less valuable.
Thus, through a kind of bundling, the manufacturer of the monopolised
good can reduce rivals’ slotting fee bids and thereby capture more of the
surplus when contracting with the retailer.
This idea has three important ingredients. Firstly, upstream firms would
be willing to pay a slotting fee only if they expect to earn a positive mark-up
from sales. As we will show, this implies that there must be some kind of
friction in contracting between upstream and downstream firms. Secondly,
for there to be effective competition for slots, the downstream firm must
face a capacity constraint (in the example, there is a single ‘best’ shelf).
Thirdly, the number of consumers who visit the downstream firm must
increase when it adds a new kind of product to its range—there must be
retail complementarity (or, put differently, demand externalities between
the different classes of product). The first contribution of this paper is to
provide a new theory of bundling by formalising this reasoning and showing
that an upstream firm can indeed profitably leverage market power by
bundling the supply of inputs.
This idea is not specific to the retail setting. Indeed, the most important
motivation for this project came from one of the largest antitrust cases in
history: the European Commission’s investigation into Google’s bundling
practices in the Android ecosystem.1 Smartphone manufacturers (the
downstream firms) wishing to pre-install the Google Play application
marketplace have been required by Google to also install and make default
1The Commission imposed a e4.3bn fine upon Google in 2018. See http://europa.
eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-4581_en.htm, accessed 24 July 2019.
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the Google Search application.2 This is an environment with upstream
mark-ups (application developers earn significant profits through advertising
and in-app purchases). Moreover, since each phone can have only one
default search engine, the downstream firm faces a capacity constraint.
Lastly, because Google Play is by far the largest mobile application store
and cannot easily be installed by end users, the European Commission
argued that consumer demand for a phone is likely to be low if Google
Play is not pre-installed. Thus, this is an environment that exhibits retail
complementarity. The conditions are therefore in place for profitable leverage
through bundling to reduce the slotting fees that must be paid to hardware
manufacturers. The potential slotting fees are significant: in perhaps the
best available counterfactual, Google pays a reported $12bn per-year to be
the default search engine on iPhone (where Google’s application store is
not available).3
On a similar note, upstream TV networks offer bundles of channels
to downstream distribution companies and earn advertising revenue when
their channel is viewed. Thus, our work speaks to ongoing policy concerns
around wholesale bundling in the pay-TV market (see Crawford, 2015, for
a discussion, and Cablevision–Viacom for a recent case).
To be more precise, suppose a final product (e.g., a smartphone), sold
by a downstream firm D, is made of various components (e.g., applications)
provided by upstream firms. There are two categories of components, A
(e.g., an app store) and B (e.g., a search engine). A is solely produced by
upstream firm U1, whereas two versions of B exist, one produced by U1 and
the other by U2. Upstream firms offer contracts to the downstream firm, who
chooses which component(s) to use and then sells to consumers. We assume:
(i) sellers of the B component compete to be chosen by the downstream firm;
(ii) the demand for the final product is higher if component A is installed
than if it is not; and (iii) contractual frictions leave upstream firms with a
2One example of Google’s so-called Mobile Application Distribution Agreement
stipulated “Devices may only be distributed if all Google Applications [listed elsewhere
in the agreement] ... are pre-installed [and] Google Phone-top Search must be set as the
default search provider for all Web search access points on the Device.” (See sections 2.1
and 3.4 of the agreement visible at http://www.benedelman.org/docs/htc-mada.pdf,
accessed 24 July 2019).
3See, e.g., https://fortune.com/2018/09/29/google-apple-safari-search-engine/,
accessed 24 July 2019.
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positive mark-up.
In keeping with the logic outlined above, we show in Section 3 that U1
can reduce the slotting fee offered by U2 by bundling A and B1. Indeed,
under bundling U2 expects that a final product that has component B2
will not have A and will therefore be bought by fewer consumers. Facing
a less aggressive rival, U1 can reduce the slotting fee it offers to D and
thereby increase its profit. When B2 is more efficient than B1, but not too
much, and when the presence of A has a large effect on the demand for the
final good, this bundling strategy allows U1 to leverage its market power
and is anticompetitive. Interestingly, when B1 is more efficient than B2,
bundling is always profitable as its only effect is to relax competition from
U2. In such a case total welfare is unaffected, but the practice harms the
downstream firm.
The result that inefficient foreclosure of firm U2 may happen in equilibrium
critically depends on the presence of a contractual friction, which, in the
baseline model, takes the reduced-form of exogenous unit mark-ups. Without
contractual frictions, efficient contracting emerges and upstream firms earn
no mark-up. However, in Section 4 we again find that inefficient foreclosure
arises when upstream firms can offer two-part tariffs but cannot perfectly
align the downstream incentives and have to keep a positive mark-up (for
instance, because of upstream moral hazard or downstream risk aversion).
In Section 5 we introduce downstream competition to our setup and
show that a similar logic as in the monopoly case can make bundling
profitable. Moreover, we can study how bundling by the upstream firm
affects competition at the downstream level—the second main contribution
of this paper. We assume that both the B components and the downstream
firms themselves are horizontally differentiated. In our setup, bundling
prevents downstream firms from differentiating along the dimension of the
B component. We show that whether or not this results in an intensification
of downstream competition depends on the distribution of tastes in the
population. For instance, if the distribution of the relative preferences
between downstream firms is symmetric and single-peaked, upstream bundling
leads to more intense downstream competition and can increase consumer
surplus. If, on the other hand, the relative preferences over downstream
firms are polarized enough, bundling can hurt consumers and reduce welfare
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(the price reduction being insufficient to compensate for the lower product
variety).
2 Literature
In this paper, bundling by an upstream firm can be profitable in the presence
of contractual frictions because it lowers the willingness of upstream rivals
to offer high slotting fees to the downstream firm. In order to highlight
our contribution and the differences with the many established theories of
bundling, we structure our discussion according to the various themes of
the bundling literature.4
Efficient bundling A first stream of papers (e.g Adams and Yellen, 1976;
Schmalensee, 1984; Bakos and Brynjolfsson, 1999) noted that bundling,
by reducing consumers’ heterogeneity, is a powerful instrument to extract
consumer surplus and can improve social welfare. This force is absent from
our baseline model, with a single buyer (the downstream firm) and no
private information.
Bundling and foreclosure Another potential role for bundling is to
extend (or leverage) a multiproduct firm’s market power from one market to
another. First dealt a blow by the Chicago School’s Single Monopoly Profit
Theory (e.g., Director and Levi, 1956; Stigler, 1963), the leverage theory
of bundling was reinvigorated by various scholars who showed bundling
could be profitably used to deter entry (e.g., Whinston, 1990; Choi and
Stefanadis, 2001; Carlton and Waldman, 2002; Nalebuff, 2004). In these
papers, bundling is profitable only to the extent that it deters entry.5 This is
in contrast to our paper, where bundling remains profitable in the presence
of a rival on the B market. Our theory thus requires a lower level of
4Fumagalli, Motta, and Calcagno (2018) provides an up-to-date review of the various
theories of bundling, and their applications.
5In Nalebuff (2004) bundling can also mitigate the adverse effects of entry. In that
paper bundling reduces the range of marginal consumer types that an entrant can capture
with a price cut, softening competition. We have only a single buyer with no heterogeneity
so this effect is absent from our model.
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commitment, compatible with contractual bundling.6 Other papers show
that foreclosure may happen even absent commitment power, simply because
bundling is optimal in the presence of rivals (Peitz, 2008; Greenlee, Reitman,
and Sibley, 2008). Buyers’ heterogeneity (or imperfect rent extraction) play
an important role in these theories. Our paper also features imperfect rent
extraction, albeit in a different setup. Choi (2003) is another paper in which
entry deterrence is not necessary: bundling lowers rivals’ incentives to invest
in cost reduction through a logic of scale effects absent from our paper.
Upstream bundling An important feature of our model is the vertical
dimension of the market: bundling occurs at the upstream level. Previous
papers have looked at this practice (also known as full-line forcing) from
different angles (see, e.g., Burstein, 1960; Shaffer, 1991a; O’Brien and
Shaffer, 2005; Ho, Ho, and Mortimer, 2012). Closest to us are Ide and
Montero (2016) and Chambolle and Molina (2018), who show how bundling
by an upstream multiproduct firm can be profitably used to exclude an
upstream rival. The differences between this paper and Ide and Montero
(2016) can be illustrated by the different implications: in Ide and Montero
(2016) bundling is necessary to achieve leverage (unlike here, see Section 4)
and, more importantly, downstream competition is necessary for bundling to
be profitable whereas our theory applies both under downstream monopoly
and competition. Chambolle and Molina (2018) share with us the feature
that slotting fees play an important role (more on this below), but their
analysis focuses on substitute products, so that our main effect (reduction
of the rival’s willingness to offer slotting fees) does not appear.
Bundling in multi-sided markets In our model, contracting frictions
introduce cross-group externalities between upstream firms and consumers:
upstream firms benefit when downstream demand is greater. The paper
therefore also relates to the literature on bundling in two-sided markets
(Choi, 2010; Amelio and Jullien, 2012; Choi and Jeon, 2016). In particular,
Choi and Jeon (2016) is also motivated in part by the Google Android case.
6Of course we require a commitment not to undo bundling if the buyer picks the
rival’s offer. But absent such commitment, bundling would have little meaning as a
concept.
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The modelling setup is quite different, however, since they do not model
the vertical chain, and rely on a different kind of friction (the impossibility
of charging negative prices to consumers) to show the possibility of leverage
through tying, whereas our theory relies on the possibility of negative
payments, i.e., slotting fees. Motivated by the Android case, Etro and
Caffarra (2017) rely on a logic related to Choi and Jeon (2016), that is
based on a zero-pricing constraint.7
Competitive bundling and compatibility Some papers study the
effects of bundling (or incompatibility) on competition among multiproduct
firms (e.g. Matutes and Regibeau, 1988; Gans and King, 2006; Armstrong
and Vickers, 2010; Kim and Choi, 2015; Zhou, 2017; Hurkens, Jeon, and
Menicucci, 2019), or among a multi-product firm and an asymmetric one
(Carbajo, De Meza, and Seidmann, 1990; Chen, 1997; Chen and Rey, 2018).
In the former setup, Zhou (2017) for instance shows that bundling is more
likely to intensify competition when there are few firms, and to soften it
otherwise. When a multiproduct firm competes with single product firms,
bundling tends to soften price-competition by introducing differentiation.
In these papers, bundling happens at the retail level (the vertical channel
is not modelled), so that retailer i forces consumers to buy products Ai
and Bi simultaneously. When we study the effects of upstream bundling
on downstream competition (Section 5), bundling forces all the retailers
who want to offer product A to also offer product B1, thus shutting down
a possible dimension of differentiation (offering B2 might generate more
downstream profits absent bundling). In this way upstream bundling can
increase downstream competition.
Slotting fees Earlier literature has emphasized the role of slotting allowances
as signalling/screening mechanisms (Chu, 1992), as well as their potential
anticompetitive effects (Shaffer, 1991b; Shaffer, 2005; Foros and Kind, 2008;
Caprice and Schlippenbach, 2013). In our paper slotting fees result both
from the positive wholesale markup induced by the contractual friction (a
mechanism discussed by Farrell, 2001) and from the constraint preventing
7See also Lee (2013) and Pouyet and Tre´goue¨t (2016) for papers on vertical integration
in multi-sided markets, the latter with a particular focus on the smartphone industry.
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the downstream firm from procuring both B components (see, e.g., Marx
and Shaffer, 2010, for a discussion of this point). The purpose of bundling is
then to reduce U2’s willingness to offer high slotting fees, thereby softening
the competition for access to final consumers.
Exclusive contracts Because of the constraint preventing the downstream
firm from using two different B components, a bundled offer is a sort
of exclusive contract whereby the downstream firm agrees to buy both
components from the same supplier. In particular, our result that anticompetitive
bundling can be profitable in the presence of contracting frictions echoes
the one by Calzolari, Denicolo`, and Zanchettin (2016), who show that such
frictions may make exclusive contracts profitable (unlike in the frictionless
environment of Bernheim and Whinston, 1998). Their mechanism differs
from ours in several respects: exclusive dealing makes the rival behave more
aggressively and a boost in demand is required to make it profitable. Here,
in contrast, bundling makes the rival softer and can be profitable even if it
does not increase the number of units sold (e.g. when B1 is more efficient
than B2).
3 Baseline model
Basic institutional environment A downstream firm, D, sells a final
good to consumers at price p. The finished good is made of components,
obtained from upstream suppliers. There are two categories of components,
A and B. Upstream firm U1 is the sole producer of the A component, but
firms U1 and U2 each compete to sell their own version of B: B1 and B2
respectively. D can only install one version of component B.8
Our main motivating example is the market for smartphones (where
8The debate around bundling of smartphone applications has mostly focused on the
manufacturer’s choice of a default application (or on which applications make it onto
the phone’s home screen dock). Capacity is constrained because there can be only one
default for each task and space on the dock is limited. Jeon and Menicucci (2012) also
study bundling in a setup where the buyer has a limited capacity. The difference between
their model and ours is that the capacity constraint is over the whole set of products,
whereas we impose a constraint on the B-applications only. More specifically, we don’t
allow the manufacturer to install B1 and B2 only, i.e., A never competes against the B
applications.
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components are pre-installed applications). In keeping with this motivation,
we assume that component Bi generates a direct revenue nri for Ui when it
is used by n consumers. This revenue may come from advertising, sale of
consumer data to third parties, or “in-app purchases”.9
Demand for the final product is Q(p, S), where p is the price and
S ∈ {{Bi}, {A,Bi}} is the set of components installed by D.10 We assume
that, for any S, D’s revenue function pQ(p, S) is quasi-concave in p and
maximized at pS. We also assume Q(p, {A,B1}) = Q(p, {A,B2}) and
Q(p, {B1}) = Q(p, {B2})—the two B components are equally attractive
to consumers (this assumption is not essential but makes the exposition
cleaner, and we relax it when we introduce downstream competition in
Section 5).
We write Π ≡ p{A,Bi}Q(p{A,Bi}, {A,Bi}) and pi ≡ p{Bi}Q(p{Bi}, {Bi})
respectively for the downstream profit gross of payments to upstream firms
when A is and is not installed alongside B.
The two key ingredients of our theory are retail complementarity and a
contractual friction.
Retail complementarity We assume demand is such that
Q ≡ Q(p{A,Bi}, {A,Bi}) > Q(p{Bi}, {Bi}) ≡ q and Π > pi.
In words: when component A is installed, (i) more consumers buy the
finished good (ii) downstream sales revenue is larger.
Contractual friction Our final ingredient is a contractual friction that
leaves upstream firms with a positive per-unit income from each consumer.
In the baseline model, we assume that the unit mark-up is exogenously
fixed and that the upstream firms’ only available instrument is their slotting
fee. To make things even simpler, we normalize the exogenous unit fee to
zero, so that the unit mark-up for Ui is ri.
11 We write FX for the lump-sum
9For brevity, we normalize component A’s revenue to zero. But our analysis easily
extends to positive revenues for A.
10For notational brevity we assume that component B is essential, but this plays no
role in our analysis.
11With positive unit payments wi to the downstream firms, our reasoning would apply
to the mark-up r˜i ≡ ri − wi.
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that the upstream producer of component X demands from D (FX < 0
corresponds to a payment to D, i.e. a slotting fee). We relax the assumption
of exogenous unit fees and allow richer contracts in Section 4.
Payoffs Given D’s optimal choice of price conditional on S, firms’ payoffs
are as follows. If the downstream firm installs A and Bi, its profit is
VD = Π−FA−FBi . If it only installs Bi, VD = pi−FBi . Firm U1’s profit if
both A and B1 are installed is V1 = FA + FB1 + r1Q. If only B1 is installed,
V1 = FB1 + r1q. Firm U2’s profits is V2 = FB2 + r2Q if B2 is installed
alongside A, and V2 = FB2 + r2q if B2 is installed without A.
Timing and equilibrium The game proceeds as follows: At t = 0, U1
announces whether it bundles A and B1. At t = 1, upstream firms make
simultaneous offers to the downstream firm. At t = 2 the downstream firm
decides which component(s) to install, and chooses a final price. Payoffs
are realized at t = 3. We restrict attention to subgame-perfect equilibria in
undominated strategies. We study the two subgames without bundling and
with bundling in turn.
3.1 Separate marketing
Let us start with the case where components A and B1 are sold separately.
Lemma 1. Suppose that ri ≥ rj. Under separate marketing:
i The downstream firm chooses components A and Bi in equilibrium.
12
ii Bj’s (rejected) offer is FBj = −(Qrj − ).13
iii The accepted offers are FA = Π− pi and FBi = −Qrj.
iv If r1 ≥ r2, firm U1’s profit is V1 = Π− pi +Q(r1 − r2). If r1 < r2, it is
V1 = Π− pi. Firm U2’s profit is then V2 = Q(r2 − r1). In both cases the
downstream firm’s profit is VD = pi + min{r1, r2}Q.
12If ri = rj then there is also the mirror allocation.
13Here we assume that , small, is the minimal size of a price change. In the
remainder of the paper we simplify notations by removing the . Without the minimal
size assumption the equilibrium in undominated strategies would be such that firm j
mixes over (−Qrj ,−Qrj + ) for  small enough, leading to equivalent outcomes. See
Kartik (2011).
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Proof. (i) Suppose S = {A,Bj}. Bj cannot offer a slotting fee above Qrj
as this would generate negative profits. But then there exists an F ′Bi that
Bi can offer to D representing a Pareto improvement for the pair (e.g.,
F ′Bi = −Qrj − ). A similar reasoning holds for A. (ii) Given A ∈ S,
each Uk is willing to offer up to Qrk. The standard logic of asymmetric
Bertrand competition implies that the least efficient firm makes the best
offer it could afford, in this case FBj = −rjQ. (iii) Given FBj = −rjQ, the
downstream firm prefers to install A and Bi rather than Bi alone (denoted
{A,Bi} % {Bi}) iff Π − FA − FBi ≥ pi − FBi . Similarly, {A,Bi} % {Bj}
implies FA + FBi ≤ Π − pi − rjQ. Lastly, {A,Bi} % {A,Bj} requires
FBi ≤ FBj . Together, these constraints imply FA = Π− pi and FBi = −rjQ.
(iv) Component A generates profit FA for U1; Bi generates profit Qri + FBi
for Ui; VD = Π− FA − FBi .
Under separate marketing, competition on the B market forces firms to
offer slotting fees FBi < 0, and therefore to transfer part of the rent to the
downstream firm.
On the A market, firm U1 can capture the direct value it brings to the
downstream firm, Π− pi. Component A also brings some indirect value to
the downstream firm, through B firms’ increased willingness to pay slotting
fees (from qri to Qri). However, U1 cannot capture this indirect value.
As we now show, bundling the two components allows firm 1 to capture
more of A’s marginal value.
3.2 Bundling
Now let firm 1 bundle A and B1 with a single transfer offer Fˆ1 = FˆA + FˆB1 .
Thus, D is constrained to choose S ∈ {{B2}, {A,B1}}. Firm 1 would only
bundle if it expects to be chosen by D; we thus restrict attention to this
case. We have:
Lemma 2. Under bundling:
i U2 offers FˆB2 = −qr2;
ii Firm 1 offers Fˆ1 = Π− pi − qr2;
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iii Firm 1’s profit is Vˆ1 = Π− pi+Qr1− qr2. The downstream firm’s profit
is VˆD = pi + qr2.
Proof. (i) FB2 < −r2q is dominated: if it were accepted U2’s profit would
be r2q + FB2 < 0. Suppose FˆB2 > −qr2 and firms do not expect B2 to
be installed. D must be indifferent between installing B2 and the bundle
(otherwise, U1 could increase Fˆ1 a little). But that means that U2 could
reduce FˆB2 and be installed for positive profit. (ii) Given FˆB2 = −r2q, D
chooses the bundle if Π − Fˆ1 ≥ pi + r2q, yielding Fˆ1. (iii) U1’s profit is
Vˆ1 = Fˆ1 + r1Q. D’s profit is VˆD = Π− Fˆ1.
Bundling allows firm U1 to extract the whole joint marginal value of
components A and B1 by keeping the downstream firm at its outside option,
pi + qr2. The key to understand this is that bundling reduces firm U2’s
willingness to pay a slotting fee. Indeed, U2 anticipates that, should B2 be
chosen, component A would not be installed. It is therefore only willing to
offer up to r2q to be installed.
Proposition 1. If r1 < r2 then firm 1 is better-off under bundling (i.e.
Vˆ1 > V1) if r1Q > r2q. If r1 ≥ r2 then firm 1 is always better-off under
bundling than under separate marketing.
The proof follows immediately as a corollary of Lemmas 1 and 2. The
gain for U1 stems from the weaker competition from U2, who now only
bids r2q instead of r2Q. When r1 < r2, bundling creates an inefficiency.
Bundling is more likely to be profitable if (i) the inefficiency, r2/r1, is small;
and (ii) component A is important to attract consumers (Q/q is large),
meaning that the effect of bundling on U2’s bid is large.
When r1 ≥ r2, there is no inefficiency associated with bundling. But
because firm 2 is still less aggressive than under separate pricing, firm 1 can
demand a larger fixed fee, and bundling is always profitable.
3.3 Discussion
Having exposed the mechanism in this simple model, we now discuss in
more details how it differs from “standard” models of bundling, and the
sensitivity of our results to some of the assumptions.
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Cost-complementarity We have already emphasized that our model
does not rely on entry-deterrence unlike, for instance, Whinston (1990).
To further understand the novelty of our mechanism, one useful way to
think about our model consists in framing it as a model of bundling with
cost-complementarity, and to compare it to a model of bundling with
consumption-complementarity in the style of the Chicago School.
Suppose that the buyer’s utility from consuming A alone, B alone,
and A and B together are respectively vA, vB, and vA + vB + ∆v, with a
consumption of at most one unit of each product. The cost of producing A
is normalized to zero, but the cost of producing B is smaller if the buyer
also consumes A, going from cBi to cBi −∆c.14 We assume that product
B2 is cheaper to produce.
In the more common model with consumption complementarity we would
have ∆v > 0 and ∆c = 0. In such a model, two forces make the bundling of
A and B1 unprofitable. First, U1 could extract the complementarity value
∆v through a higher stand alone price, pA = vA + ∆v. Second, bundling
makes U2 more aggressive, offering pB2 = cB2 under bundling, instead of
pB2 = cB1 under independent pricing.
In our model where complementarity is at the cost level (i.e., ∆v = 0,
∆c > 0), the first force is removed, while the second is reversed. Indeed, first
U1 cannot charge the buyer for the cost saving ∆c of the other supplier, as
the buyer would prefer not to buy A if pA > vA. Second, bundling makes U2
less aggressive, offering pB2 = cB2 instead of pB2 = cB1 −∆c (the condition
for bundling to be profitable being that cB2 > cB1 −∆c).
Such complementarities at the cost level may seem artificial when the
buyer is a final consumer, but they emerge naturally when the buyer is a
downstream firm who enjoys a larger demand when it offers product A,
provided that the B supplier receives a positive mark-up for each unit (see
below for a more thorough discussion of more general contracts).
Exclusion and profit shifting Another difference with the main theories
of bundling is that bundling does not have to cause exclusion to be
profitable. Whenever r1 > r2, the downstream firm would choose B1
14In our model such costs are −riq and −riQ, so that ∆c is in fact firm specific,
∆ci = ri(Q− q). This distinction is not important.
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with or without bundling. Bundling in this case is not inefficient, but it
harms the downstream firm who no longer exploits upstream competition
to the fullest.
Moreover, although bundling excludes U2 from being chosen when r2 ≥
r1, the profitability of bundling does not require B2 to exit the market.
Indeed, U1 still faces a competing offer made by U2 in equilibrium. This is
in contrast to classic models, such as Whinston (1990), where bundling is
only profitable if it completely forecloses competing offers from the market
(and otherwise makes competition tougher). Thus, the continued presence
of rival firms in the market does not suffice to nullify competitive concerns
when bundling is at the upstream level.
Timing and commitment Regarding the timing, two assumptions
stand-out, namely that bundling is announced prior to offers being made,
and that offers are simultaneous. Let us discuss these points in turn.
If U1 could not commit to bundling in stage 1, but could choose to
bundle A and B1 at the same time as it makes its offer, there would be a
multiplicity of equilibria. One equilibrium would be for U1 not to bundle its
products, with the same offers as in Lemma 1. But, when r1Q ≥ r2q (i.e.,
when bundling is profitable), there is another equilibrium where U1 bundles
its products and firms play as in Lemma 2.15 Therefore, the assumption’s
function is that of equilibrium selection, and is not necessary for bundling
to be profitable. This point distinguishes us from several papers in the
literature, in particular where the profitability of bundling results from
a commitment to bundling before rivals’ entry decision (Whinston, 1990;
Carlton and Waldman, 2002). We discuss further the equilibrium selection
role of bundling in Section 4.
The simultaneity of the offers at t = 1 plays a more critical role in making
bundling profitable. To see this, suppose that r2 > r1. If negotiation over
component A occurred before B, bundling would no longer be optimal: U1
would offer a payment FA = Π− pi + r1(Q− q). In the second stage, both
firms would offer FBi = r1Q if the first period offer had been accepted,
FBi = r1q otherwise. U1’s profit would be Π− pi + r1(Q− q), greater than
15Notice however that in this equilibrium, there is no strict incentive to bundle given
U2’s behavior.
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the profit under bundling, Vˆ1.
U1 would therefore have incentives to push the negotiations over A
early. Two points are worth mentioning here. First, the downstream firm
would have the opposite incentives, and would do its best to accelerate the
negotiations over B. Second, a strong degree of commitment is required
for such a strategy to work: U1 must commit not to make a subsequent
offer at the start of the second period of negotiations if D has rejected the
first offer. Given that details of the negotiations are secretly held most of
the time, it would be hard for outsiders to observe a deviation from the
commitment not to make a second offer, and therefore reputation vis-a`-vis
third parties is unlikely to help sustain this commitment.
Of course, our model also requires a certain degree of commitment power
by U1, as do all models where pure bundling occurs in equilibrium: U1 must
be able to commit not to offer A on a stand-alone basis if D accepts B2’s
offer. Unlike the type of commitment discussed above, reputation vis-a`-vis
third parties is more likely to help here: it would be fairly easy to observe
that D has installed B2 alongside A, and therefore that U1 has reneged its
commitment to bundle.
Side payments Would bundling still be profitable if upstream firms could
contract with one another? This question is particularly relevant when B2
is more efficient than B1. Suppose accordingly that r2 > r1.
A first possibility is a contract whereby firm U1 agrees not to offer B1
to the downstream firm. For U1 to accept such a contract, U2 must offer a
payment at least equal to Qr1−qr2—the extra profit generated by bundling.
If firm U1 accepts, firm U2 no longer needs to offer any positive payment
to the manufacturer, and its profit is at least Qr2, which is larger than
Qr1− qr2. Even though such a contract dominates bundling, it would likely
be deemed anti-competitive.
A second possibility would be for U2 to pay U1 not to bundle A and
B1, without requiring it not to offer B1. As before, firm U1 must receive a
payment at least equal to Qr1 − qr2 to accept. This time, though, firm U2
still faces competition on the B market, and its profit is V2 = Q(r2 − r1)
(see Lemma 1). Therefore, when 2Qr1 > (Q + q)r2, U2 cannot profitably
induce firm U1 to unbundle A and B1.
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Bargaining While we assume that upstream firms make the offers, it
would be straightforward to extend the model to give more bargaining power
to the downstream firm, for instance by having it make the offers with some
probability. The results would essentially be the same, as long as D does
not have all the bargaining power.
Only one B component For simplicity we make the assumption that
consumers can only access one B product through the final good. There are
two implications: that the downstream firm cannot offer two varieties of
the B product, and, particularly relevant for the smartphone applications
market, that consumers cannot install another B product themselves. In
the model these assumptions are consistent with the perfect substitutability
assumption, so that neither the downstream firm nor consumers would have
a strict incentive to do so. In a model with either horizontal or vertical
differentiation, our insights would continue to hold provided we interpret
the choice by D as the choice of a “default” or prominent component and
at least some consumers exhibit a form of status quo or saliency bias. Such
bias is well documented in a variety of market contexts (see Samuelson
and Zeckhauser (1988) for experimental evidence and Fletcher (2019) for a
discussion in the context of smartphone applications).
Downstream unbundling While we study a framework where the downstream
firms themselves offer a bundle to final consumers (irrespective of whether
there is upstream bundling), our insights would carry over to situations
where downstream firms sell each product separately, as is the case for
example in the retail sector. Cross-product externalities could then come
from the presence of shopping costs, as in Caprice and Schlippenbach (2013)
(see also Rhodes, 2014; Thomassen et al., 2017). For instance, suppose that
each consumer has a downward sloping demand Q̂A for product A, Q̂B for
product B, as well as an idiosyncratic shopping cost s. Consumers obtain
more surplus, and are therefore more likely to visit the retailer if it offers
both products than if it only offers B. For brevity, we do not replicate our
analysis in such a setup.
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4 More general contracts
We now allow upstream firms to offer more general contracts in the form
of two-part tariffs. Under a tariff Ti = (wi, Fi), D pays nwi + Fi to the
producer of component i if it chooses to install it and if the final demand is
n.
4.1 Frictionless contracting
The timing is as follows: at t = 0, U1 publicly announces whether it bundles
A and B1 or not. At t = 1, U1 and U2 offer two-part tariffs to D. A t = 2,
D selects the set of components it installs, and chooses a final price p. At
t = 3 payoffs are realized.
Unlike fixed fees, the level of the unit fees w affects the optimal price
chosen by D. If D installs components A and Bi, the joint profit of the
involved firms would be maximized by setting wA = 0 and wBi = −ri, so
that D’s price reflects the true marginal cost of the vertical structure.16 We
denote this maximal joint profit by Πi, and Qi is the corresponding quantity
sold given that the price is chosen optimally.17 If D installs only Bi, the
optimal unit fee is again wBi = −ri, and the corresponding joint profit and
quantity are denoted pii and qi.
Notice that in any equilibrium where D installs A and Bi the joint profit
must equal Πi. Moreover, if ri ≥ rj, we have Πi ≥ Πj, Qi ≥ Qj, pii ≥ pij
and qi ≥ qj.18
We also make the following set of assumptions:
Assumption 1. If ri ≥ rj, we have:
(a) Πi − pii ≥ Πj − pij
(b) Πj ≥ pii and Qj ≥ qi
Part (a) means that adding A to the product is more valuable if the
chosen B component is the most efficient one. Part (b) implies that the
16If ri > 0 the marginal cost of Bi is negative.
17I.e., Πi = (p
∗
i +ri)Q(p
∗
i , {A,Bi}) and Qi = Q(p∗i , {A,Bi}), where p∗i ≡ arg maxp{(p+
ri)Q(p, {A,Bi})}.
18That Πi ≥ Πj follows from a revealed preferences argument. Qi ≥ Qj because the
optimal price is a decreasing function of r.
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asymmetry between B1 and B2 is not too large compared to the value of
installing A.
By allowing firms to set two-part tariffs we have removed a contractual
friction from the model. We can now see the important role such frictions
play in leverage:
Proposition 2. Bundling A and B1 is not profitable if upstream firms can
offer two-part tariffs.
The proofs of this section appear in the appendix. Intuitively, competition
in two-part tariffs leads firms to offer the efficient level of the unit fee,
wBi = −ri and wA = 0. Upstream firms’ profits are therefore independent
of quantity sold downstream and competition only takes place with respect
to the fixed fees. But this set-up is equivalent to one in which the “single
monopoly profit theory” applies: when B2 is more efficient than B1, U1 can
charge a higher price for product A if it does not bundle it with B1.
4.2 Upstream moral hazard
We now discuss the profitability of bundling when some contracting friction
prevents firms from designing contracts that achieve the joint first-best. In
particular, we are interested in frictions that lead the upstream firms to offer
contracts with a positive unit margin. Such a situation is not unrealistic,
at least if one gives any credence to the idea that double-marginalization is
a widespread problem in vertical relations. For our purpose, any friction
leading to a positive upstream mark-up (wBi > −ri) would work; we focus
on moral hazard.
Suppose that, after D has chosen which B component to install, the
selected upstream firm can exert a non-contractible effort that increases
the final demand.19 Such effort could consist of advertising or product
improvement. A two-part tariff such that wi = −ri would leave Ui with
no incentives to exert effort because its profit would be independent of
the number of units sold. Equilibrium contracts should therefore involve
positive upstream markups so as to induce effort.
19Only the supplier of the B-component can exert such effort. Later we discuss the
possibility of investment by the A supplier.
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To keep notations simple, we focus on the following technology: effort is
binary e ∈ {0, 1}, with cost ke, k > 0. A positive effort increases demand
by ∆. We assume that a positive level of effort is always efficient.
The timing is the following: at t = 0, U1 publicly announces whether it
bundles A and B1 or not. At t = 1, U1 and U2 offer two-part tariffs to D.
A t = 2, D selects the set of components it installs. At t = 3 the supplier
of the selected B component chooses whether to exert effort. At t = 4, D
observes the level of effort and chooses a final price p.
Optimal fee and notations If D has opted for component Bi, Ui finds
it optimal to exert effort if and only if (wBi +ri)∆ ≥ k. Therefore, assuming
that it is optimal to induce effort by Ui, the unit fee that maximizes the joint
profit of D and its suppliers is wBi = −ri + k/∆. Any smaller value leads
to no effort; larger values exacerbate the double-marginalization problem.
After payment of the unit fees, the B supplier is therefore left with a revenue
of nk/∆ if n units are sold.
We define Πi and pii as D’s profit gross of lump-sum transfers with and
without A, when wBi = −ri + k/∆ and Ui exerts effort. Analogously, define
Qi and qi as the corresponding quantities with and without A. To be more
precise, let
p∗S ≡ arg max
p
{(
p+ ri − k
∆
)
[Q(p, S) + ∆]
}
.
Then we define Qi ≡ Q
(
p∗{A,Bi}, {A,Bi}
)
+ ∆ and Πi as
Πi ≡
(
p∗{A,Bi} + ri −
k
∆
)
Qi.
Likewise, qi ≡ Q
(
p∗{Bi}, {Bi}
)
+ ∆ and
pii ≡
(
p∗{Bi} + ri −
k
∆
)
qi.
Let Π˜i and pii be the corresponding objects when wBi = −ri and Ui does
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not exert effort.20 We maintain Assumption 1, and assume that the value
of component A is not reduced when the B supplier exerts effort:
Assumption 2. For i = 1, 2, Πi − pii ≥ Π˜i − pii.
For the sake of brevity we only present results for the case where r2 > r1,
implying bundling is inefficient.
4.2.1 Bundling
Because wBi > −ri, upstream profits depend on the number of consumers
served. Thus, as in Section 3, bundling limits the slotting fees offered by
U2 by decreasing demand when B2 is installed.
Lemma 3. There is a unique equilibrium under bundling in which U2 is
foreclosed and U1’s profit is Π1 − pi2(Q1 − q2)k/∆− k.
In equilibrium both upstream firms offer the efficient unit fee that induces
effort, wi = −ri + k/∆. U2’s losing bid offers all the joint profit (without
A), pi2 + q2k/∆, to D. U1’s offer makes D indifferent between Π1 − F1 and
pi2 + q2k/∆, and U1 gets the mark-up k/∆ for the Q1 units sold.
4.2.2 No bundling: possibility of virtual tie
When U1 does not impose bundling through a contractual or technical
requirement, the ensuing subgame has a multiplicity of equilibria, some of
which deliver outcomes that are similar to the equilibrium under bundling.21
Lemma 4. Suppose that r2 > r1. In the model with upstream moral hazard
and two-part tariffs, there are two types of equilibria.
1. Efficient equilibria, such that D installs {A,B2}, always exist.
Firm U1’s profit ranges from
1
2
(Π1 − pi1 + Π2 − pi2) to Π2 − pi2.
2. There also exist inefficient equilibria, i.e. such that D installs
{A,B1}, whenever (Q1 − q2)k/∆− k ≥ Π2 − Π1. U1’s profit ranges
from Π2 − pi2 to Π1 − pi2 + (Q1 − q2)k/∆− k.
20I.e., Π˜i = maxp {(p+ ri)Q(p, {A,Bi})}, and pii = maxp {(p+ ri)Q(p, {Bi})}.
21The multiplicity of equilibrium payoffs comes from the fact that the binding
constraint on the fixed fees paid to D only pins down FA + FBi .
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In an efficient equilibrium, unit fees are wA = 0 and wBi = −ri + k∆ .
The logic is then similar to Lemma 1: U2 anticipates that D will also install
A and is therefore willing to offer a large slotting fee (up to Q2k/∆). More
specifically, the best equilibrium for U1 has FA = Π2−pi2, FB2 = pi2−pi1−Q1k∆
and U1’s rejected offer for B1 is FB1 = −Q1k∆ .
Inefficient equilibria correspond to what Carlton and Waldman (2002)
call a “virtual tie”: U1 adjusts the unit fees so as to make it unprofitable for
D to install B2 alongside A, while keeping wA + wB1 at the efficient level.
In effect, firm 1 creates a virtual bundle through its choice of contracts.
Anticipating this, U2 is no longer willing to offer a large slotting fee. One
strategy profile that sustains U1’s preferred equilibrium is: wA = r2 − r1,
wB1 = −r2 + k∆ , FA = Π1 − pi2 and FB1 = − q2k∆ . U2’s rejected offers are
wB2 = −r2 + k∆ and FB2 = − q2k∆ .22
The next Proposition is obtained as a corollary from Lemmas 3 and 4.
Proposition 3. When (Q1− q2)k/∆−k > Π2−Π1, the unique equilibrium
under bundling delivers the same profit to U1 as the best equilibrium under
no bundling.
When (Q1 − q2)k/∆− k < Π2 − Π1, bundling is not profitable for U1.
With two-part tariffs and upstream moral hazard, U1 can again profitably
leverage its market power. This can be achieved either by explicitly bundling
A and B1 (“real tie”), or through an appropriate choice of fees (“virtual
tie”). The value of (explicit) bundling comes from the first-mover advantage
it gives to U1, allowing it to select its preferred equilibrium.
Discussion of moral hazard with A Our assumption that the effort
only concerns producers of the B component is less innocuous than our
assumption that A does not generate any revenue. Indeed, with moral
hazard on both markets there would be an efficiency argument for having
B1 instead of B2: a mark-up on A (necessary to induce effort on the
A component) would reduce the need for a further markup on B1, but
not on B2, to induce effort. This logic is similar to the logic of double
22Off the equilibrium path, if U2 offers FB2 < − q2k∆ , D installs B2 alone even though
it is indifferent with installing B2 and A. In the proof we construct an equilibrium that
does not rely on this tie-breaking assumption.
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marginalization in the pricing of complements. While it would make the
analysis of the game much more intricate, it would not affect the key insight
that bundling reduces B2’s willingness to offer slotting fees. In terms of
welfare, bundling would be less likely to be inefficient, given that, provided
r2 is not too large compared to r1, the efficiency gains from having a single
upstream provider (outlined just above) would offset the fact that r2 > r1.
5 Downstream competition
We now turn to the analysis of the case where there is downstream competition.
We show that the mechanisms that can make bundling profitable with a
downstream monopoly continue to operate. Competition also introduces
new considerations: components become a potential source of differentiation
between downstream firms, and bundling can therefore affect final goods
prices and consumer surplus.
We maintain the same setup as in Section 3, in particular with exogenous
unit mark-ups ri. For the sake of conciseness we assume that A is essential
throughout this section, i.e. that a downstream firm cannot make any sales
if its final product does not include component A (results would go through
even if A was not essential.). In the preceding analysis, this corresponds to
the particular case where q = 0. We also assume that B firms are symmetric
and have the same revenue, r1 = r2 = r, which allows us to focus more
cleanly on the effects brought by downstream competition.
We introduce an additional downstream firm to the market, and denote
the two downstream competitors by L and R. The timing of the game is as
follows: at t = 0, U1 publicly announces whether it bundles A and B1 or
not. At t = 1, upstream firms make secret offers to the downstream firms.
At t = 2, L and R choose which components to install. At t = 3, L and R
choose the price of their product. Sales and payments are realized.
We look for perfect-bayesian equilibria in undominated strategies. We
assume passive beliefs: when a downstream firm receives an out-of-equilibrium
offer at t = 1, it does not change its belief regarding the offers received by
its competitor.
A downstream firm’s profit (excluding fixed fees) depends on which B
components are installed. Let ΠS be the value of this gross profit when they
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both choose the same B component, and ΠD when they choose different
ones. We assume that in both cases the number of consumers served is Q.23
The following Lemma characterizes situations in which firm U1 offers A
and B1 separately.
Lemma 5. Under separate marketing of A and B1: (i) both downstream
firms install A; (ii) They install different B components if ΠD > ΠS, and
the same B component if ΠD < ΠS.
Similarly to the case with one downstream firm, the equilibrium under
separate marketing maximizes the profits of the industry.
Under separate marketing, there is a multiplicity of offers that are
compatible with the equilibrium allocation described by Lemma 5. Because
our point is to show that firm U1 can leverage its market power through
bundling, we henceforth focus on the best equilibrium for firm U1 under
separate marketing. We now distinguish two cases, according to whether
ΠD > ΠS or not.
5.1 Efficient differentiation: ΠD > ΠS
Consider first the case in which ΠD > ΠS. The most natural setup would
be one where B components are an important means by which downstream
firms differentiate themselves, so that choosing different B components
would soften competition (see below for a discrete choice model that makes
this point more clearly). In that case, differentiation is efficient at the
industry level.
Proposition 4. When ΠD > ΠS, bundling is profitable if rQ ≥ ΠD − ΠS.
By a logic similar to the case with a downstream monopolist, bundling
allows U1 to capture more of the profit from the B market. However it
cannot extract as much of downstream firms’ profit because the lack of
differentiation intensifies competition. Bundling is profitable when the latter
effect is relatively small.
23Relaxing this assumption is straightforward but does not bring much insight.
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5.2 Inefficient differentiation: ΠS > ΠD
We now turn to the case where ΠS > ΠD, as might be the case when the B
components exhibit large network effects or, as the discrete choice model
below makes clear, when the intrinsic differentiation among downstream
firms is stronger than the differentiation between the B components.
Proposition 5. Suppose that ΠS > ΠD. Then bundling is strictly profitable
for firm U1.
Bundling brings two kinds of benefits to U1 here. The first, obvious
one, occurs in the case where, absent bundling, the downstream firms
would coordinate and choose B2. Bundling A and B1 eliminates this
possibility. The intuition for the second benefit is related to the case with
one downstream firm when r1 > r2. Given that it is efficient from the
perspective of the industry for both downstream firms to choose the same
B provider, bundling does not create any inefficiency. Its only effect is to
lower the price that U1 has to pay the downstream firms, given that U2
becomes less aggressive.
5.3 Upstream bundling with downstream competition:
a discrete choice model
To investigate the effects of bundling on downstream competition and
consumer surplus, we must specify some more structure for demand. Suppose
that the unit mass of consumers have types {x, y}, with x and y independently
distributed. Variable x measures the extent of the consumer’s preference
for downstream firm L over R (with x negative if the consumer prefers
R). Similarly, y measures the preference for B1 over B2. Let them be
independently distributed, x ∼ F (·) and y ∼ G(·), both symmetric around
zero and with continuous densities f and g. We assume the market is
covered: consumers choose whichever downstream firm yields the highest
utility, accounting for its choice of B component and its price. We focus on
symmetric equilibria in pure strategies.
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B component differentiation Suppose that L installs component B1
and R installs B2.
24 Then a consumer prefers L if pL − x− y ≤ pR, where
pi is the price charged by i ∈ {L,R}. This implies a demand for firm L
equal to
DL(pL, pR) = Pr(pL − x− y ≤ pR) =
∫
R
1−G(pL − pR − x)dF (x).
Firm R’s demand is DR(pR, pL) = 1−DL(pL, pR).
The firms choose prices to maximize piD(pi, pj). Computing the first-order
condition and imposing symmetry yields
p∗ =
1
2
∫
Rg(−x)f(x) dx
as the symmetric equilibrium price.25.
No B component differentiation If L and R install the same B
component then a consumer prefers L if pL−x ≤ pR. Demand is Di(pi, pj) =
1− F (pi − pj). Maximizing downstream profit (piD(pi, pj)), and imposing
symmetry yields the equilibrium price
p∗∗ =
1
2f(0)
.
Comparison and profitability of bundling Both with an without
differentiation, each downstream firm serves half the market so profit is
simply p/2. Thus, downstream firms prefer the configuration that yields
the highest price: we have ΠD > ΠS if and only if
f(0) >
∫
R
g(−x)f(x) dx. (1)
This expression has a clear economic interpretation. Without B component
differentiation, the marginal consumers are those who like both L and R
equally and f(0) measures the density of such consumers. When the firms
differentiate, the marginal (i.e., indifferent) consumers are those for whom
24By symmetry, this is equivalent to L choosing B2 and R choosing B1.
25Here, we use symmetry to imply D(p∗, p∗) = 1/2, simplifying the expression for p∗
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their preference for L is exactly offset by a preference against B1—i.e., for
whom y = −x. Thus, ∫Rg(−x)f(x) dx is the density of marginal consumers
under differentiation. Firms choose whichever configuration minimizes the
density of marginal consumers and thus the intensity of competition.
Bundling prevents downstream firms from differentiating theirB components.
Using Propositions 4 and 5, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 6. (i) If (1) holds then B component differentiation maximizes
downstream profits. Upstream bundling prevents differentiation and is
profitable if r > 1
2
∫
Rg(−x)f(x) dx
− 1
2f(0)
. (ii) If (1) fails then downstream
firms never differentiate in B components and bundling is unambiguously
profitable.
A special case is when consumers draw a firm-specific taste shock, xi, for
each downstream firm such that x ≡ xL−xR. If xL and xR are independently
and identically distributed then the implied f(x) is uni-modal and (1) is
guaranteed to hold.
More generally, tastes for L and R may be correlated in which case
f(x) need not be single-peaked. Writing Φ(· : µ, σ2) for the CDF of
the normal distribution with mean µ and variance σ2, suppose we let
F (x, µ, σ) = 1
2
Φ(x : µ, σ2) + 1
2
Φ(x : −µ, σ2) and G(y, σ) = Φ(y : 0, σ2).
In this formulation, for µ large enough, F is a bi-modal distribution with
peaks at ±µ. Thus, µ measures the polarization of tastes over downstream
firms and condition (1) becomes µ < σ
√
2 ln(2).26 If µ is large then the
peaks of F are far apart and each downstream firm has many consumers
who are quasi-captive. Installing different B components causes some of
these ‘captive’ consumers to become contested (because they have a strong
preference for the other firm’s chosen B component). Conversely, if µ is
small then many consumers are close to being indifferent between the two
firms and installing different components is then the only way to soften
competition. Figure 1 illustrates.
Bundling and consumer surplus If (1) fails then bundling does not
change downstream firms’ prices or their choice of B components, and
26We require σ to be not too small for there to be a symmetric equilibrium in pure
strategies (see Figure 2).
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Figure 1: Distribution of consumers’ relative preferences between L and R,
when they install different B components (solid lines) or the same (dashed
lines) and charge the same price. x ∼ F (·, µ, σ) and y ∼ G(·, σ). When µ
is small (left panel), there are more marginal consumers (s.t. z = 0) when
both L and R install B1, and equilibrium price is lower. The right panel
depicts the reverse situation, for larger values of µ.
therefore has no effect on consumer surplus or total welfare. When (1)
holds, bundling reduces the price that consumers pay for the finished good
(by eliminating a source of downstream differentiation). In this setup
with unit demand and a covered market the final price does not affect
total welfare, and preventing differentiation is socially inefficient. However,
the falling price raises the intriguing prospect that bundling might leave
consumers better-off overall.
To investigate this possibility, suppose that (1) holds. In a symmetric
equilibrium, consumers choose {L,B1} over {R,B2} before bundling if
x > −y. They choose {L,B1} over {R,B1} after bundling if x > 0. A
consumer who switches from R to L gains x, while one who switches from
B2 to B1 gains y. Putting these changes in match utility together with the
effect of bundling on prices, bundling causes consumer surplus to increase if
∫ +∞
0
∫ −x
−∞
f(x)g(y)(x+ y) dy dx+
∫ 0
−∞
∫ −x
−∞
f(x)g(y)y dy dx
−
∫ 0
−∞
∫ +∞
−x
f(x)g(y)x dy dx+ p∗ − p∗∗ > 0. (2)
For example, if F (x) = 1
2
Φ(x : µ, σ2) + 1
2
Φ(x : −µ, σ2) and G(y) =
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Figure 2: Effect of bundling on consumer surplus. Condition (1) holds in
the shaded areas. Bundling causes consumer surplus to fall in the hatched
area but increase in the dotted area.
Φ(y : 0, σ2) then the effect of bundling on consumer surplus is illustrated
in Figure 2. Bundling increases consumer surplus in the dotted area.27 If
µ is small then most consumers have x close to zero and eliminating the
ability to differentiate B components significantly intensifies competition
and lowers prices.
As another example, suppose that consumers draw an independent
and identically distributed taste shock xi for each downstream firm i, with
xi ∼ Φ(x : 0, σ22 ). Then the aggregate preference, x = xL−xR, is distributed
according to F (x) = Φ(x : 0, σ2). If G(y) = Φ(y : 0, σ2) then Figure 2 with
µ = 0 applies and consumers benefit from bundling.
As an aside, although not formally modelled in this paper, the fact that
bundling can benefit consumers through lower downstream prices provides
another possible justification for bundling by Google. Indeed, low prices
27We have verified that the first-order condition is sufficient over the relevant range in
this example (to the right of the dashed line). For σ small and µ large, consumers have
such polarized tastes over downstream firms that a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium
cannot be sustained: firms would prefer to give up on competing for the few marginal
consumers and exploit their (large) mass of pseudo-captive customers.
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for Android devices serve to commodify the hardware, which should help
Google in the ecosystem competition against Apple’s rival platform.
5.4 Uniform versus discriminatory bundling
In the preceding analysis we allowed U1 to offer a bundle to both firms
(we call this situation ‘uniform bundling’). An alternative, especially if
bundling is contractual, would be to discriminate by offering a bundle to L,
while offering A and B1 separately to R (a practice we call ‘discriminatory
bundling’). Under no bundling or discriminatory bundling there are a
multiplicity of equilibria; for concreteness, we select the equilibrium that
maximizes U1’s profit. This assumption minimizes the size of the range over
which uniform bundling is profitable.
By making U2 less aggressive in its bid to L, discriminatory bundling
allows U1 to extract more surplus from L while still permitting differentiation
in B components. It therefore always dominates no bundling. Thus, some
form of bundling will occur in equilibrium and the relevant question is when
discriminatory bundling is preferred to uniform bundling.
Proposition 7. If ΠD > ΠS then U1 chooses discriminatory bundling when
rQ < 2(ΠD − ΠS) and uniform bundling otherwise. If ΠD < ΠS then U1 is
indifferent between discriminatory and uniform bundling.
Compared to uniform bundling, discriminatory bundling allows U1 to
extract less of the B-market surplus but has the advantage of allowing B
component differentiation. Thus, discriminatory bundling is preferred when
differentiation is especially important and when the potential B market
revenues to be captured are not too large. Conversely, when differentiation
in B components is not important and B-market revenues are large, U1
prefers uniform bundling to extract more of the B-market surplus.
6 Conclusion
Our contribution in this paper is twofold. The first—and main—one is to
suggest a new mechanism through which an upstream multi-product firm
can leverage its market power through bundling. The mechanism works in
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environments that exhibit the following features: (i) Downstream firms have
a limited number of “slots”, which implies that upstream firms compete
to be selected; (ii) there are positive externalities among products (what
we call retail-complementarity): the presence of product A increases the
demand for the B product. This could be because the downstream firm itself
offers a bundle whose demand increases with the number of components, or
because consumers incur shopping costs to visit the downstream firm. (iii)
contractual frictions (e.g. upstream moral hazard) prevent sell-out contracts
and leave upstream firms with a positive unit margin.
In such environments, bundling reduces the rival upstream firms’ willingness
to pay to be selected by the downstream firm. This can result in inefficient
exclusion of the rivals if their product is slightly better than that of the
multi-product firm. Interestingly, when the multi-product firm is more
efficient than its rivals, bundling does not cause exclusion (which would
happen anyway), but is still profitable as it relaxes the competition for slots.
The mechanism does not require a strong level of commitment,28 and can
be “virtually” achieved through an appropriate choice of fees. This point
suggests that a mere ban on contractual bundling may be insufficient to
prevent anticompetitive outcomes.
Our second contribution concerns the effect of upstream bundling on
downstream competition. While the above mechanism continues to apply
in competitive settings, a new effect appears: upstream bundling prevents
downstream firms from horizontally differentiating through their choice of B
supplier. We show that under some conditions this intensifies downstream
competition and can even result in larger consumer surplus.
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A Omitted Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2
(1) Case with r2 > r1. Suppose that U1 bundles A and B1. Let T1 =
(w1, F1) be U1’s offer, with w1 = −r1.
First, in equilibrium, U2 must offer wB2 = −r2 and FB2 = 0. Indeed,
D must be indifferent between {A,B1} and {B2}, and if wB2 6= −r2 than
U2 could profitably deviate and induce D to choose {B2}. Given that
wB2 = −r2, we obtain FB2 = 0 using standard weak dominance arguments.
Given U2’s offer, U1’s accepted offer must then satisfy Π1−F1 = pi2 for D
to be indifferent between {A,B1} and {B2}. U1’s profit is then Vˆ1 = Π1−pi2.
Suppose instead that U1 chooses not to bundle A and B1 and sets
wA = 0, wB1 = −r1 and FB1 = 0 (i.e., it makes the best possible offer for
B1). For D to choose {A,B2}, three conditions must hold: (i) FB2 ≤ Π2−Π1
(so that D prefers {A,B2} to {A,B1}), (ii) FA ≤ Π2−pi2 (so that D prefers
{A,B2} to {B2}), and (iii) FA + FB2 ≤ Π2 − pi1 (so that D prefers {A,B2}
to {B1}). The worst configuration for U1 is when constraints (i) and (iii)
are binding. In this case its profit is V1 = FA = Π1−pi1, which is still larger
than Vˆ1. Bundling is therefore not profitable.
(2) Case with r1 > r2. Under bundling, B2’s rejected offer must be
wB2 = −r2 and FB2 = 0. The profit of U1 is therefore equal to the maximal
fee it can charge D, i.e. Vˆ1 = Π1 − pi2.
If U1 does not bundle its products and offers wA = 0 and wB1 = −r1,
then D installs {A,B1} in equilibrium. Again, B2’s rejected offer must be
wB2 = −r2 and FB2 = 0. The constraints that FA and FB1 must satisfy are
(i) FB1 ≤ Π1−Π2 (so that D prefers {A,B1} to {A,B2}), (ii) FA ≤ Π1−pi1
(so that D prefers {A,B1} to {B1}), and (iii) FA + FB1 ≤ Π1 − pi2 (so that
D prefers {A,B1} to {B2}). By Assumption 1(b), constraint (iii) is binding,
so that V1 = Π1 − pi2 = Vˆ1.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 3
If U1 bundles A and B1, in equilibrium D must be indifferent between
{A,B1} and {B2} (otherwise U1 could demand higher fixed fees). B2’s
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rejected offer must be wB2 = −r2 + k/∆ and FB2 = −q2k/∆ : wB2 =
−r2 + k/∆ maximizes the joint profit, and FB2 = −q2k/∆ allocates all
the profit to D. Lower values of FB2 are dominated strategies, while
higher values could not constitute an equilibrium (U2 could reduce FB2 and
profitably induce D to install B2). Thus, D’s profit if choosing {B2} is
pi2 + q2k/∆.
In equilibrium U1 must offer w1 = −r1 + k/∆, so that the maximal fixed
fee it can charge is given by Π1 − F1 = pi2 + q2k/∆. U1’s profit is therefore
Vˆ1 = F1 + (r1 + w1)Q1 − k = Π1 − pi2 + (Q1 − q2)k/∆− k.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 4
Efficient equilibria First, in an efficient equilibrium, we must have wA = 0
and wB2 = −r2 + k/∆ to maximize the realized joint profit. wB1 is not
uniquely pinned down in equilibrium but, for our purpose, we can focus on
equilibria where the rejected B1 offer would have induced effort if accepted,
i.e. wB1 = −r1 + k/∆. Let FB1 be the rejected offer’s fixed fee.
For D to select {A,B2} rather than respectively {A,B1}, {B2} or {B1},
we must have (i) FB2 ≤ Π2 − Π1 + FB1 , (ii) FA ≤ Π2 − pi2 and (iii)
FA + FB2 ≤ Π2 − pi1 + FB1 . By Assumption 1(b), (iii) is always binding.
There is then a continuum of (FA, FB2) compatible with (i)-(iii). U1’s
associated profit ranges from V E1 ≡ Π1 − pi1 (when (i) also binds) to
V
E
1 ≡ Π2 − pi2 (when (ii) also binds). Let us check that these constitute
equilibria of the subgame without bundling.
Let us take a (FA, FB2) compatible with (i)-(iii). Neither D nor U2 have
a profitable deviation from such a strategy profile. Could U1 profitably
deviate? The only possibility would be to make offers such that D chooses
{A,B1}. One constraint would then be that D prefers {A,B1} to {B2},
i.e. Π1 − F ′A − F ′B1 ≥ pi2 − FB2 . Because (iii) is binding, we have FB2 =
Π2 − pi1 + FB1 − FA. Therefore the deviation must satisfy Π1 − F ′A −
F ′B1 ≥ pi2 − (Π2 − pi1 + FB1 − FA). Now, we know that in an {A,B2}
equilibrium, U1’s profit V1 is equal to FA. So the previous constraint
rewrites as Π1 − pi1 + Π2 − pi2 + FB1 − V1 ≥ F ′A + F ′B1 . The best deviation
by U1 is therefore to make this constraint binding. Its new profit is then
F ′A +F
′
B1
+Q1k/∆ = Π1−pi1 + Π2−pi2 +FB1 −V1 +Q1k/∆. The deviation
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is not profitable if Π1 − pi1 + Π2 − pi2 + FB1 − V1 +Q1k/∆ ≤ V1 i.e. if
2V1 ≥ Π1 − pi1 + Π2 − pi2 + FB1 +Q1k/∆. (3)
The lowest profit that can accrue to U1 in an efficient equilibrium is such
that (3) binds and FB1 takes on its minimum possible value, −Q1k/∆. We
then have V1 =
1
2
(Π1 − pi1 + Π2 − pi2). The highest profit is found when
V1 = V
E
1 = Π2 − pi2. We can check this is compatible with equilibrium by
substituting into (3) to yield FB1 ≤ Π2 − pi2 − (Π1 − pi1) − Q1k/∆. This
is not ruled out by weak dominance, since weak dominance only rules out
FB1 < −Q1k/∆.
Inefficient equilibria Take  arbitrarily close to zero and consider
the following strategy profile: wA = r2 − r1 + , FA = Π1 − pi2 − q2,
wB2 = −r2 + k∆ , FB2 ∈ [Π2 − Π1 − Q1k∆ + k + q2, −q2∆ ], wB1 = wB2 − ,
FB1 = FB2 .
D’s profit if it installs {A,B1} is Π1 − FA − FB1 = pi2 + q2 − FB2 . If
it installs {A,B2}, its profit is Π1 − Q1 − FA − FB2 = pi2 − Q1 − FB2 . If
it installs B1 alone, its profit is pi2 + q2 − FB2 . If it installs B2 alone, its
profit is pi2 − FB2 . So D chooses {A,B1} whatever the value of FB2 .
The key aspect of U1’s strategy is that (wA, FA) are chosen such that
D always strictly prefers {B2} to {A,B2} for any value of FB2 . Therefore,
given that FB2 ≤ − q2k∆ , U2 is not willing to increase the slotting fee it offers
(i.e. to offer F ′B2 < FB2) because it would lose money by doing so.
Under this strategy profile, U1’s profit is V1 = FA + FB1 +
Q1k
∆
− k =
Π1 − pi2 − q2 + FB2 + Q1k∆ − k. The best possible deviation for U1 would
be to induce D to install {A,B2} by choosing w′A = 0 (so as to maximize
the joint profit) and F ′A = Π2 − pi2 (along with high prices for B1). The
resulting profit would be V ′1 = Π2−pi2. When FB2 ≥ Π2−Π1− Q1k∆ +k+ q2
such a deviation is not profitable.
As the possible equilibrium values of FB2 cover the interval [Π2 − Π1 −
Q1k
∆
+ k + q2,
−q2k
∆
], V1 goes from Π2 − pi2 to Π1 − pi2 + (Q1−q2)k∆ − k − q2.
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A.4 Proof of Lemma 5
Suppose that one downstream firm, say L, does not install A in equilibrium.
Then, because offers are secret, firm U1 could increase its profit by requiring
a small payment from L in exchange for installing A. This offer would be
accepted by L.
Suppose now that L expects R to choose A and Bi. If firms U1 and
U2 expect L to install A, they are willing to offer L a slotting fee up to
FLBi = −rQ to be installed by L. If ΠD > ΠS, firm j can convince L to install
Bj , even when i offers F
L
Bi
= −rQ, by offering FLBj = −rQ+(ΠD−ΠS)− >
−rQ. A symmetric reasoning applies when ΠD < ΠS.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 4
Let us start with the case of independent pricing. We know from Lemma 5
that the downstream firms install different B components in equilibrium.
Suppose that L installs A and B1 whereas R installs A and B2.
First, we know that if Bj is not chosen by downstream firm k then j
must offer F kBj = −rQ, because of our focus on non-dominated strategies.29
Second, we look at the conditions for L to choose {A,B1} given offers
FLA , F
L
B1
and FLB2 = −rQ, and given that R installs A and B2. L must prefer
{A,B1} to {A,B2}, i.e.
FLB1 ≤ −rQ+ ΠD − ΠS (4)
It must also prefer {A,B1} to {B1}, which implies
FLA ≤ ΠD (5)
Last, it must prefer {A,B1} to {B2}, i.e.
FLA + F
L
B1
≤ −rQ+ ΠD (6)
Condition (6) is actually binding, and therefore the profit that firm U1
obtains from its interaction with L is rQ+ (FLA + F
L
B1
) = ΠD: all the profit
29As in the model with downstream monopoly, rigorously speaking F kBj is chosen
randomly over an interval (−rQ,−rQ+ ) with  close to zero. See footnote 13.
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from selling the final product to consumers is captured by firm U1, but the
downstream firm still enjoys a rent of rQ due to the competing offer by
firm U2.
We now turn our attention to manufacturer R. There are multiple
equilibria here, but for our purpose (finding sufficient conditions for bundling
to be profitable), we can focus on the best equilibrium for firm U1. U1 cannot
charge more than ΠD for installing A, but there is an equilibrium in which
it charges exactly this: FRA = ΠD, F
R
B1
= −rQ and FRB2 = −rQ. With such
offers, R chooses A and B2 and gets a profit equal to rQ. Firm U2 gets a
profit of zero but cannot offer less to R, as otherwise R would simply install
B1 alone and get rQ.
Putting the two previous paragraphs together, firm U1’s total profit
under independent pricing is 2ΠD.
When U1 bundles A and B1, U2 cannot ask for a positive fixed fee in
exchange for installing B2 because A is essential. U1 can therefore offer
FLA + F
L
B1
= FRA + F
R
B1
= −ΠS and generates a profit of 2(ΠS + rQ).
Comparing this profit to the maximal profit without bundling (2ΠD) gives
the result.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 5
Under separate marketing, we know that both downstream firms install the
same B component, and that the losing B component must offer F kBj = −rQ
to both k = L and k = R.
If L and R install B2, the best equilibrium for U1 is such that F
L
A =
FRA = ΠS, F
L
B1
= FRB1 = −rQ, and FLB2 = FRB2 = −rQ (U2 cannot demand a
larger payment because downstream firms would deviate by installing B1
and not installing A). Firm U1’s profit is 2ΠS.
If L and R install B1 instead, the best equilibrium for U1 is such that
FLA = F
R
A = ΠS, F
L
B1
= FRB1 = −rQ, and FLB2 = FRB2 = −rQ. U1’s profit is
2ΠS.
In both cases firm U1 extracts the whole profit generated by sales to
consumers (2ΠS), but relinquishes a rent equal to 2rQ to downstream firms.
Under bundling, F kB2 = 0 and firm U1 offers F
L
A +F
L
B1
= FRA +F
R
B1
= 2ΠS,
for a profit of 2(ΠS + rQ).
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A.7 Proof of Proposition 7
Suppose U1 offers a bundle to L while allowing R to choose A or B1
separately. This can only be optimal if L chooses the bundle.
First, suppose ΠD > ΠS. R must install {A,B2} in equilibrium (by
Lemma 5). The most that U1 can charge L is the F
L
1 such that L is indifferent
between {A,B1} and its outside option of zero: FL1 = ΠD. Turning to R,
U1 cannot charge more than ΠD for installing A but there is an equilibrium
in which it charges exactly this: FRA = ΠD, F
R
B1
= −rQ and FRB2 = −rQ.
Putting the profit from L and R together, U1 earns 2ΠD + rQ. Comparing
this to the profits from no bundling and uniform bundling (given in the
proof of Proposition 5) yields the result.
Now suppose ΠD ≤ ΠS. In equilibrium R must install {A,B1} (by
Lemma 5). The most that U1 can charge L is the F
L
1 such that L is indifferent
between {A,B1} and its outside option of zero: FL1 = ΠS. Turning to R,
if A is expected to be installed then U2 must offer F
R
B2
= −rQ, implying
all of the B-market revenues accrue to R. U1 cannot charge more than ΠS
for installing A but there is an equilibrium in which it charges exactly this:
FRA = ΠS, F
R
B1
= −rQ and FRB2 = −rQ. Putting the profit from L and R
together, U1 earns 2ΠS + rQ. This is the same as the profits from uniform
bundling (given in the proof of Proposition 4).
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